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Abstract—Stochastic model checking has been used
recently to assess, among others, dependability mea-
sures for a variety of systems. However, the employed
numerical methods, as, e.g., supported by model
checking tools such as PRISM and MRMC, suffer
from the state-space explosion problem. The main
alternative is statistical model checking, which uses
standard simulation, but this performs poorly when
small probabilities need to be estimated. Therefore,
we propose a method based on importance sampling
to speed up the simulation process in cases where the
failure probabilities are small due to the high speed of
the system’s repair units. This setting arises naturally
in Markovian models of highly dependable systems.
We show that our method compares favourably to
standard simulation, to existing importance sampling
techniques and to the numerical techniques of PRISM.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of probabilistic model checking is to
quantitatively evaluate the validity of performance
and dependability properties of stochastic systems.
After the system has been modeled as a Markov
chain, or specified in terms of a higher-level lan-
guage such as AADL [19], properties of interest
are specified using the logic pCTL [11] or CSL [1].
Then, a model checker is invoked to determine in
which states of the Markov chain these properties
are satisfied.
Two main approaches to probabilistic model
checking have emerged in recent years. In the
first (numerical) approach one generates the state
space of the Markov model beforehand and then
numerically determines in which states the specified
pCTL or CSL formula holds [1], [2]. In the second
(statistical) approach, the behaviour of the system
over time is repeatedly simulated in order to draw
a conclusion about whether the property is satisfied
in a certain state at a given level of confidence [21],
[20].
Both of these approaches can experience prob-
lems when the probabilities of interest become
small. For estimating probabilities using simulation
it is a well-known rule of thumb that for a rare event
probability p, 100/p simulation runs are needed
to obtain a reasonable estimate [5]. In modern
dependable (embedded) computer and communica-
tions systems, interesting probabilities of the order
of magnitude of 10−8 are not uncommon, and
methods to speed up the simulation process receive
an increasing amount of attention.
Importance sampling is a sophisticated form of
simulation that uses information about the system
model to speed up the simulation process. If done
correctly, this can lead to large increases in the
efficiency. The price that we pay for such better
estimates is the loss of generality. Any stochastic
system can be simulated naively, but an importance
sampling approach that works in one setting will
typically fail to perform well in other settings.
For example, a system consisting of components
that are prone to failure can be highly dependable
because the individual component failure rates are
low or because the repair rates are high, yet the
technique from [18] was proven to work well only
in the former setting.
As a consequence, we need to restrict ourselves
to certain types of models and rare events in this
paper. The models considered here describe systems
consisting of parallel component types as will be
explained in detail in Section II. We are mainly
interested in the case where the repair rates are high,
as this is a common situation in practical model
checking problems for which existing importance
sampling approaches have no fully satisfactory an-
swer, but we will also consider the case where
the failure rates of components are low. We do
not need to impose that the component failure and
repair rates remain constant when one or several
components have already failed.
The properties of interest are expressed using
CSL, as we are interested in the continuous time
behaviour of these systems. We will consider both
the (transient) unreliability and the (steady-state)
unavailability, also to be described in Section II.
Admittedly, this is still considerably different from
being able to evaluate whether an arbitrary CSL-
formula holds. However, we view our current
method as a first step towards more general stochas-
tic model checking procedures.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section II we introduce the distributed database
system that we will use as a case study, specify
probabilities of interest and explain how to estimate
those probabilities using simulation. In Section III
we describe importance sampling in the general
setting. In Section IV we introduce our approach
and analyse its theoretical strengths and limitations.
In Section V we evaluate our technique empirically
and compare it to standard statistical model check-
ing, to another, very general importance sampling
scheme and to the numerical techniques of the
model checking tool PRISM. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. MODEL & PRELIMINARIES
As said in the introduction, importance sampling
methods use information about the way rare events
occur in the model to speed up the simulation.
Because this information depends heavily on the
model, we must first specify what type of mod-
els we will consider. In this section we will first
describe our case study and use it to specify what
kind of modes our method can handle. We will then
specify what probabilities we need to estimate and
how to do this using standard simulation, as we
will need the ideas behind it for our discussion of
importance sampling in Section III.
A. Distributed Database System
1) Model Description: The distributed database
system is a benchmark problem in the field of de-
pendability evaluation [17]. It was recently studied
in [4], and a variant was studied in [8]. It can be
seen as part of a more general class of systems
consisting of parallel component types. We assume
that the system as a whole is fault-tolerant, and
that the probability of system failure is low either
because of the component failure rates being low
or because of the repair rates being high.
Specifically, the distributed database system con-
sists of 24 disks that are grouped together in 6
clusters of 4 disks, 4 disk controller units divided
into two sets that each access three disk clusters
and a processor that accesses the disk controllers.
The processor has a spare that takes over in case
of failure. There is one repair facility for each of
the six disk clusters, one for each of the two sets
of disk controllers and one for the processor and its
spare. The system is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A distributed database system
We can distinguish 9 component types. Types
i = 1, . . . , 6 represent the disks in cluster i, types
7 and 8 represent the disk controllers in sets 1 and
2 respectively and type 9 represents the processors.
The interfailure times and repair durations are as-
sumed to be exponentially distributed. Let ~x be a
vector in N9 in which each element xi denotes how
many components of type i have failed. We call this
vector the state of the process. The system will be
assumed to start in an initial state ~x0 at time t0 = 0.
Let D = {1, . . . , 9} be the set of component
types. The failure and repair rates of components of
these types may depend on the current state, so let
the failure rates be some nonnegative function λi(~x)
for each component type i ∈ D and ~x ∈ N9. Let
the repair rates similarly be given by nonnegative
functions µi(~x). The failures and repairs are called
transitions. The repair rate of component type i can
only be positive when there is at least one failed
component of type i, and the failure rate can only
be positive if there are components of type i left
that are operational.
Figure 2. The distributed database system modeled as a
stochastic Petri net.
We also note that the system can be modelled as a
stochastic Petri net (SPN; see, e.g., [3]). In Figure 2
the system of the case study is depicted as an SPN.
Each state is then a marking, the component types
are then places and the number of tokens in place
i then represents the number of failed components
of type i.
2) Operation and Failure: The system is said to
be operational if a processor can access all the data
in the disks — this condition is satisfied if each
of the following subconditions holds: (1) at least
one processor is up, (2) at least one disk controller
in each of the controller clusters is up, and (3) at
least three disks are up in each of the six disk
clusters. In general, the method that we introduce in
this paper works when system failures occur if for
at least one component type i, a specified number
ni of components has failed. System failure in the
benchmark setting falls into this category.
Using this definition of system failure we can
formalise what kind of measures we will estimate.
The unreliability is the probability that the system
stops being operational at some point before a
specified time bound τ . The unavailability is the
steady-state probability that at some time point t
in steady-state the system is not operational. Unre-
liability properties can be expressed using CSL as
P./p(♦<τ fail) and steady-state unavailability prop-
erties as S./p(fail), where fail is an atomic property
that is assigned to all states which represent system
failure as defined earlier.
3) The Benchmark Case and Generalisations:
The failure and repair rates of the individual com-
ponents are given by:
unit failure rate repair rate
disks λ µ
disk controllers 3λ µ
processors 3λ µ
In the benchmark case (see [4]) we have λ =
1/6000 and µ = 1. The rates in the literature are
per hour, and the time bound τ for the unreliability
is 5 weeks, so equal to 840 in this setting. The
individual components all have the same failure
distribution regardless of how many other compo-
nents are up. E.g., the total failure rate of type 1
components (the first disk cluster) is 4λ when no
components are down, 3λ when one component has
failed, and so on. The component repair rate of each
i is always µ if xi > 0, because there is only repair
facility per type.
One further generalisation is the number of
spares. We introduce a new parameter n and assume
there are n processors, n disk controllers per set
and 2n disks per cluster. For n = 2 we are back
in the benchmark case. Let failure in this more
general setting be defined to occur when either (1)
no processor is up, (2) in one disk controller set,
no disk controller is up or (3) in one disk cluster at
least n disks are down.
B. Discrete Event Simulation
Now that we have modeled the system and spec-
ified probabilities that we want to estimate, we will
discuss how these probabilities can be estimated.
The standard simulation-based approach is called
standard discrete-event simulation or Monte Carlo
simulation.
1) Path Generation: As mentioned in the intro-
duction, we repeatedly simulate the behaviour of
the system in order to come up with an estimate.
The result of one simulation procedure is called a
sample run or path. We define a run (timed path)
to refer to a series of states and transition times
that occur until we stop observing the system. By
a (timeless) path we just refer to the series of
states that we encountered. Let Ω be the set of all
runs, then this is the sample space from which we
randomly sample runs ω. We will not further delve
into the measure theoretic background of Ω in this
paper.
We generate samples from Ω as follows: we start
the run at time t0 = 0 in state x0, which for
the unreliability is given by the ‘empty’ state ~0.
Then we consecutively determine which transition
is taken and how long it takes until this transition
is taken. This is done as follows: let, at step k, ~xk
be the state and let its exit rate η(~xk) be defined as
η(~xk) =
∑
j′∈D
λj′(~xk) + µj′(~xk). (1)
We pick the transition j of type i as the next
transition to be taken with probability
p~xk(j) =

λi(~xk)
η(~xk)
, if j is a failure transition,
µi(~xk)
η(~xk)
, if j is a repair transition.
(2)
Also, let Tk be the time instance at which the k’th
step is taken. Then we let the sojourn time ∆ =
Tk+1 − Tk have probability density
f~xk(δ) = η(~xk)e
−η(~xk)δ. (3)
We continue until we can terminate - a condition
that depends on the property whose validity we seek
to evaluate.
2) Estimating the unreliability: Let Φr be the
event that the system hits a failure state before
time τ , which we assume to be a model parameter
given before the start of the simulation. Then the
unreliability is given by pi = P(Φr) = E(1Φr ),
where 1Φr (ω) denotes the indicator function which
equals 1 if ω satisfies Φr and 0 otherwise. For
each sample run we can evaluate whether Φr was
satisfied on that run. So, after having sampled a
series of runs {ωi, . . . , ωN} we can estimate P(Φr)
using
pˆi =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1Φr (ωi). (4)
Let σˆ be the sample standard deviation of our
series of runs. The 95%-confidence interval for this
estimate is then given by (see [14], page 254)[
pˆi − 1.96 σˆ√
N
, pˆi + 1.96
σˆ√
N
]
.
3) Estimating the unavailability: Estimating the
steady-state unavailability using simulation is a
little bit more tricky. To avoid having to ‘warm-up’
the simulation before it reaches approximate equi-
librium we apply a renewal argument. We partition
the behaviour of the system as time progresses into
disjoint busy cycles. A busy cycle starts and ends
when we enter state ~0. Let V be the steady-state
unavailability, let Z be the amount of time during
which the system is unavailable during a busy cycle
and let D be the duration of a busy cycle. Then
E(V ) = E(Z)/E(D). The ratio estimator vˆ is given
by
vˆ =
zˆ
dˆ
, (5)
where zˆ and dˆ are the Monte Carlo estimates
for E(Z) and E(D) respectively. This estimator is
biased, but strongly consistent (i.e., vˆ → E(V ) as
N →∞; see [14], page 533). We generate different
runs for the estimates zˆ and dˆ to avoid dependence.
This becomes even more necessary when we use
importance sampling because techniques that focus
on rare events would lead to a large variance of dˆ
(more details will be given in Section IV-D). The
95%-confidence interval (see [14], pages 532–533)
is then given by[
vˆ − 1.96 σˆv
dˆ
√
N
, vˆ + 1.96
σˆv
dˆ
√
N
]
,
where σˆ2v = σˆ2z+σˆ2dvˆ2 and σˆ2z and σˆ2d are the sample
variances of sequences containing the V ’s and D’s
respectively.
Although the above estimation procedures work
in many cases, the downside is that when the
probability that we need to estimate is small the
number of runs N that we need in (4) or (5) is
enormous. Finding a solution to this problem will
be the focus of the next two sections.
III. PRINCIPLES OF IMPORTANCE SAMPLING
In this section, we will only describe importance
sampling for estimating the probability of failure
before time τ , but something similar can be done
for the steady-state unavailability. The problem with
small probabilities is that the fraction of runs in
which a rare event happens is very small. When we
apply importance sampling, we carry out a similar
stepwise procedure as in the Section II-B1 but we
use a different probability distribution in order to
increase this fraction.
In this section, we will first describe importance
sampling in Section III-B and then introduce the so-
called zero-variance estimator on which we base our
method in Section III-C. Before we start with the
formal definitions of the aforementioned concepts,
we first give an intuitive description.
A. Intuitive Description
Assume that we want to estimate some small
probability w. Using standard simulation, we ran-
domly draw zeros and ones such that the fraction
of ones is expected to be w (see (4)). Suppose
we now somehow make the probability of drawing
a non-zero twice as large. Then, if we multiply
the value 1Φr (ωi) of the ith run in (4) by 12 , we
obtain an estimator that is unbiased and which has
a lower variance than the standard estimator. Now
suppose we already know w and make drawing a
non-zero exactly w−1 times as likely. Hence, we
draw a non-zero with probability one and multiply
each 1Φr (ωi) by the precise probability that we
wish to estimate, resulting in an estimator with zero
variance.
Unfortunately, the systems we study are far too
complex to ‘just’ multiply the probability of draw-
ing a non-zero by some number and multiply by a
constant weighting factor. There are too many ways
in which the event of interest can occur. We will
need to tweak the individual transition probabilities
and sojourn time densities, and in order to obtain an
efficient new distribution we need to know enough
about our system. The basic way to do this in
complex stochastic systems will be discussed below.
B. Basic Setup of Importance Sampling
Recall that we consider systems consisting of
parallel component types. Assume that we can at
least divide the transitions into two classes: repair
transitions and failure transitions. Also assume that
failure transitions have low rates. One could ask
how this makes the probability of system failure
small. A first answer could be that the low com-
ponent failure rates cause the failure transitions to
rarely ‘win the race’ against the repair transitions.
So, assume that at some step of the simulation
process we are in a state where at least one repair
transition is enabled. The idea is now to use a
new probability distribution p∗, which we call the
simulation distribution (also known as a change of
measure), for the simulation such that the com-
ponent failure probabilities are much higher than
under the old distribution (2). We compensate for
this overestimation by weighting the estimate with
the ratio of p and p∗ — like the factor 12 of the
example in III-A.
Every time a transition is sampled using the new
density this weighting factor needs to be considered.
The final weighting factor L of each run ωi, called
the likelihood ratio, is simply the product of the
individual ratios p~xk/p∗~xk in the run. Our new
estimator then becomes
pˆi =
1
N
N∑
i=1
L(ωi) · 1Φr (ωi). (6)
It is easy to prove that this estimator is unbiased
for any new distribution that assigns positive prob-
ability to transitions that have positive probability
under the old distribution.
We do not need to restrict ourselves to changing
the transition probabilities. Note that the system
failure probability can also be small because the
time interval [0, τ ] is too short for a sufficient
number of component failures to occur. To remedy
this, we can replace the sojourn time density f of (3)
by a new density f∗ with a higher transition rate. If
we also account for the ratios f/f∗ in the likelihood
ratio L then our estimator remains unbiased and, if
done correctly, has an even lower variance.
C. Zero Variance
Consider the following ideal situation: for every
state ~x and time points t ∈ [0, τ ] we already know
the probability of system failure within τ − t time
units. Call this probability w(~x, t). Let χ(~x, j) be
the new state that we obtain if transition j is chosen
when we are in state ~x, and J the set of all
transition indices. Then we can introduce a new
simultaneous density of the transition j ∈ J and
sojourn time δ, i.e.,
p∗~x(j, δ) = (7)
p~x(j, δ) · w(χ(~x, j), t− δ)∫ T
0
∑
j′∈J p~x(j′, δ′) · w(χ(~x, j′), t− δ′)dδ′
,
where p~x(j, δ) = p~x(j) ·f~x(δ). This new simulation
density was proven to yield an estimator with zero-
variance in [6]. Of course, we do not explicitly
know the function w, or else we would not need
to simulate. However, we might be able to come
up with an approximation wˆ for w. Then, we
replace the function w in (7) by this approximation.
If the simulation distribution associated with the
approximation wˆ is good enough then we have
succeeded in overcoming the main problem facing
standard Monte Carlo simulation of rare events.
IV. THE NEW SIMULATION DISTRIBUTION
The obvious next question is how to find a good
way to find an approximation wˆ that we can use to
replace w in (7). In the following subsection, we
will, as a first step, split the joint distribution of (7)
into two distributions for the transitions and sojourn
times respectively, and explain how to draw sojourn
times in an efficient manner. In the remaining
subsections we will find better approximations for
w step-by-step.
A. Drawing Sojourn Times
If w were known explicitly we would use (7)
by first drawing a transition and then selecting
a sojourn time conditional on this transition. The
latter step, drawing sojourn times δ from (7), can
be computationally expensive. Typically, the distri-
bution function of the sojourn time conditioned on
a transition j is not invertible, which would force us
to resort to accept-reject schemes (see [12], chapter
18).
To avoid this, we apply our first simplification:
we use the old density function of δ conditional on
transition j to occur before time τ − t. This gives
us the following density:
f∗~x(δ) =
η(~x)e−η(~x)δ
1− e−η(~x)(τ−t) .
The failure transitions are then drawn with proba-
bility
p∗~x(j) =
p~x(j) · wˆ(χ(~x, j), t)∑
j′∈J p~x(j′) · wˆ(χ(~x, j′), t)
(8)
for some approximation wˆ yet to be determined
(remember that J is the set of all transition indices).
The technique of conditioning sojourn times on
being smaller than τ − t is called forcing (see [15]
or [16]). We do this for all transitions individually.
One could also draw a whole series of transitions
and then condition on the sum of their sojourn times
being smaller than τ−t, but then we would have to
deal with general sums of exponentially distributed
random variables and that is something we want
to avoid, as the evaluation of distribution functions
of these sums can quickly become computationally
expensive.
B. Approximating w using Straight Paths
A way of approximating rare event probabilities
is to consider only the paths that lead to system
failure of components of a certain type i (that is,
xi ≥ ni) without cycles. We define a cycle as a
sequence of states in which the first and last state
are the same. They necessarily consist of at least
one failure and one repair transition.
Consider any state ~x 6= ~0 and a cycle starting
in ~x of which the first transition is a component
failure. For this cycle to occur, the failure transition
must have occurred before a repair transition. When
the component failure rates are made smaller or
the repair rates are made higher, the occurrence of
paths that contain these cycle becomes less likely.
Accordingly, the straight paths — i.e., those without
cycles — become a better approximation. This
motivates the following, most basic, approximation
for w.
Let a straight path to failure be a path that ends
in a system failure state and which contains only
failure transitions of a single component type. Let
d be the number of types. From each state ~x, we
have d straight paths to failure, one for each type
k. Let νk failures remain until the critical level nk
is reached, and let the vector of states that are seen
along this path be denoted by [~xk,0, . . . , ~xk,νk ], with
~xk,0 equal to ~x. The probability of this path being
taken equals
p([~xk,0, . . . , ~xk,νk ]) =
νk−1∏
i=0
λj(~xk,i)
η(~xk,i)
,
where η(~x) is defined as in (1). We can then use
wˆ∗(χ(~x, j), ti) = wˆ∗(χ(~x, j))
=
d∑
k=1
νk−1∏
i=0
λj(~xk,i)
η(~xk,i)
(9)
as a time-independent approximation of w. From
now on, the ∗ in wˆ∗ indicates that we only use the
straight paths as an approximation.
C. Probability Contribution of Paths with Cycles
Unfortunately, the approximation (9) is too crude.
One shortcoming of wˆ∗ is that the most likely path
from a state ~x′ to system failure might not be one of
the d straight paths. In many cases, the most likely
path is the path in which the system first returns
to state ~0 and then takes one of the straight paths
that determine wˆ∗(~0). This can be seen in Figure 3,
which depicts the state space of a simplified model
with only two component types. Starting from state
~x′ in Figure 3, the dashed path is (when the rates
are realistic) much less likely to occur than the
solid line path because the failure transitions of the
dashed path need to win the race against the repair
transition of type 2.
~0 ~x′
x2 →
x
1
→
Figure 3. A model consisting of two types of components. One
type has a many more spares than the other, but its components
fail more quickly.
Accordingly, we also consider the straight paths
from state ~0 for our approximation wˆ(~x′). From
state ~x′, the system returns to state ~0 with proba-
bility almost equal to one. Therefore, for each state
~x we can use the sum of wˆ∗(~x) and wˆ∗(~0) instead
of just the former. As a consequence, the jump from
state ~0 to state ~x′ will more often be taken under
the new distribution. This is desirable — paths that
contain cycles between state ~0 and the states where
one component has failed are almost equally likely
as the straight paths from ~0.
However, the contribution of wˆ∗(~0) needs to be
time-dependent — cycles to the empty state are
only likely when the empty state’s exit rate η(~0)
is high enough compared to the remaining time
τ − t. Otherwise, the extra jumps take too much
time, which reduces the likelihood of these paths.
A crucial insight is that the time-independent
function wˆ∗(~0) is still a good approximation for
the probability of hitting a system failure state
during a busy cycle. When the failure rates are
low or the repair rates are high, the duration of
the busy cycle is almost completely determined
by the time spent in state ~0. Therefore, the time
it takes before we reach a system failure state
is the sum of M busy cycle durations Di. Here,
the durations Di are all independent and exponen-
tially distributed approximately with the rates η(~0),
whereas the number M follows a geometric distri-
bution with approximate success parameter wˆ∗(~0).
From elementary probability theory we know that
this sum follows an exponential distribution with
rate η(~0) · wˆ∗(~0), hence the probability that this is
completed before τ − t time units has approximate
probability 1− exp(−η(~0) · wˆ∗(~0)(τ − t)).
For small x, 1 − e−x approximately equals x.
Therefore, we do not use wˆ∗(~0) as our approxi-
mation for w(~0) but the time-dependent function
η(~0) · wˆ∗(~0)(τ − t). This motivates our final ap-
proximation,
wˆ(~x, t) = (10){
wˆ∗(~0) · (τ − t) · η(~0), if ~x = ~0,
wˆ∗(~x) + wˆ∗(~0) · (τ − t) · η(~0), otherwise .
This new distribution (10) keeps the estimator ef-
ficient when the rarity of the event of interest is
not caused by the low component failure rates but
rather the high recovery rates. Our numerical results
will show that this adaptation is crucial in practical
situations.
D. Steady State Unavailability
So far, we have described how to estimate the
unreliability Φr, but a similar approach can be
used for the unavailability V . Consider the ratio
estimator (5). The problem that we face is that for
the vast majority of runs the time fraction Z(ω) will
equal zero, regardless of whether the failure rates
were low or the repair rates were high. So, we need
to increase the probability of hitting a system failure
during a busy cycle.
The procedure will be as follows: we start in
the empty state and simulate using (10) substituted
into (8) — since this is a steady-state performance
measure we set τ − t ≡ 0 in (10), thus effectively
disabling returns to state ~0. We stop when we reach
system failure and from then on simulate using
the old distribution until we reach state ~0 [13].
Meanwhile, we record the amount of time during
which the system was in a failed state.
If we would apply the same distribution as we
used for (Z), the paths that immediately fall back
to the empty state before reaching a system failure
state are never sampled because wˆ(~0, t) ≡ 0. This
has no effect on the unbiasedness of the estimator
zˆ because paths that immediately fall back to ~0
contribute nothing to E(Z). However, they do con-
tribute heavily to E(D). Therefore, to avoid bias
and inconsistency in dˆ we generate two series of
runs, one for Z with importance sampling and one
for D without importance sampling [10]. After we
have computed the estimates, we substitute them
into (5) and use the same confidence interval as the
one described in Section II-B.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate that our method
produces good results in practice. We compare our
method to a few other well-known techniques. The
first of these is the standard Monte Carlo method.
A more efficient method is that of balanced failure
biasing (BFB) combined with forcing (see Section
IV-A or [15]). Under BFB, the total probability of a
component failure is set to 12 , uniformly distributed
over the individual component types (and similarly
for the repairs — for more information, see [18]).
The third simulation method found in the result ta-
bles of this section are the estimates produced using
our new method, abbreviated as Path-IS. Finally, we
will compare our method to the numerical methods
of the model checking tool PRISM.
When we display the experimental results in a
table, we first give the statistical estimates. These
are either the standard Monte Carlo estimates as
in (4) or importance sampling estimates as in (6),
which will be clear from the context, and are given
in the form of a 95%-confidence interval. To the
right of the estimates, we state the number of
simulation runs used to produce these estimates.
The number of simulation runs for each method
was picked such that the computation time was
comparable to that of PRISM. In the last row(s),
we display the numerical solutions and the number
of states in the PRISM and Arcade models (the
latter tool uses lumping/bisimulation minimisation
to reduce the size of the state space). The exact
computation and simulation times are specified in
the text of the following subsections.
A. Experimental Setup
Next, we will describe how we will test the
strength of our method. Of course, there is a funda-
mental difference between the numerical approach
and the statistical approach in the sense that nu-
merical methods (if they converge) give an almost
perfect (depending on the stopping criterion) ap-
proximation after some fixed time interval. On the
other hand, statistical methods produce confidence
intervals that can be made as narrow as one would
like, depending on how much time one is willing
to spend. The best way to say something about the
applicability of an approach for the user is to look
at the wall-clock time.
We used a computer with a 2.8 GHz
Intel® CoreTM 2 Duo processor (32-bit) and
3 GB of RAM, running Windows XP. All
simulations were run with a simple Java program
that generated (pseudo-)random numbers using a
fast Mersenne twister 1. We used version 3.3.1 of
PRISM.
B. Unavailability
Of the two measures discussed in this paper, the
unavailability is the easiest to approximate. Because
it considers the system when it is in equilibrium, no
information about the transient behaviour of the sys-
tem is needed. Numerical methods to analytically
determine or iteratively approximate it are well-
established.
First, we will show in Table I that our results
are consistent with the other tools and the liter-
ature, namely [4]. The unavailability in [4] was
only given in one significant digit, and the total
run time was not specified. When we lower the
vˆ (10−6) # runs
MC 3.677± 0.778 388 196
BFB 3.647± 0.104 169 484
Path-IS 3.511± 0.035 79 611
v (10−6) # states
PRISM 3.498 421 875
Arcade 3 2 100
Table I
Unavailability (vˆ) results for the benchmark case.
λ = 1/6000, µ = 1, n = 2.
component failure rate parameter λ from 1/6000 to
1
6 · 10−6, we get similar results, with the exception
of standard Monte Carlo. This is displayed in Table
II. Increasing µ from 1 to 1, 000 gives us equivalent
vˆ (10−12) # runs
MC 5.847± 11.460 386 538
BFB 3.532± 0.105 165 943
Path-IS 3.521± 0.036 78 179
v (10−12) # states
PRISM 3.500 421 875
Table II
Unavailability (vˆ) results when λ = 1
6
· 10−6;µ = 1, n = 2.
results, as depicted in Table III (note that the un-
availability values for λ = 16 · 10−6 and µ = 1, 000
are exactly the same. This is not a coincidence, as
the solution depends only on the transition rates
through the ratio λµ ). In all these cases PRISM does
better than the simulation approaches discussed so
far — indeed, for models with small state spaces
PRISM’s steady-state techniques can be preferred to
simulation, regardless of λ. However, if we increase
the number of spare components n to 3, the size
of the state space blows up from 421 875 states
to 7 529 536, as can be seen in Table IV. This
causes PRISM’s computation time to increase, from
about 3.4 seconds for Tables I-III to 113.1 seconds
for Table V. When we increase n even further,
1http://www.cs.gmu.edu/∼sean/research/
vˆ (10−12) # runs
MC 0± 0 384 418
BFB 3.504± 0.102 165 115
Path-IS 3.465± 0.035 76 923
v (10−12) # states
PRISM 3.500 421 875
Table III
Unavailability (vˆ) results when µ = 1, 000;
λ = 1/6000, n = 2.
n # states # non-zeros
2 421 875 5 737 500
3 7 529 536 111 329 568
4 66 430 125 1 027 452 600
5 382 657 176 6 087 727 800
6 1 655 595 487 26 853 394 932
Table IV
State space sizes and numbers of non-zero entries in the
transition rate matrix of the models built by PRISM for
different values of n.
vˆ (10−9) # runs
MC 7.235± 6.135 12 977 468
BFB 5.656± 0.151 3 434 986
Path-IS 5.580± 0.015 1 315 050
v (10−9) # states
PRISM 5.578 7 529 536
Table V
Unavailability (vˆ) results when n = 3; µ = 1, λ = 1/6000.
we hit tougher boundaries on the applicability of
numerical methods due to the state space explosion
problem. For n ≥ 4, the amount of memory that
our system has available for “creating [a] vector
for diagonals” is insufficient and PRISM terminates
without giving a solution (even after adjusting the
memory usage maxima in PRISM’s settings). For
n = 6, Path-IS still produces accurate estimates
when we set the simulation time to a mere 60
seconds, as can be seen in Table VI. BFB underesti-
mates the unavailability, a well-known phenomenon
when the change of measure being used is not
suitable for the problem [7].
vˆ (10−16) # runs
MC 0± 0 6 708 624
BFB 0.148± 0.225 803 752
Path-IS 1.173± 0.016 205 654
v (10−16) # states
PRISM N.A. 1 655 595 487
Table VI
Unavailability (vˆ) results when n = 6; µ = 1, λ = 1/6000.
C. Unreliability
The unreliability is (from a theoretical point of
view) a more interesting case than the unavailability
because, unlike the latter value, the former value
is not known in closed form for the models that
we consider [9] — hence, we simply have to use
numerical and/or statistical methods. First, note that
we have defined the unreliability to refer to the
probability of system failure before some time point
τ (in this case 840 hours), allowing the repair of
components in this time interval. In [4] and [17],
component repairs were not allowed to occur.
Because PRISM’s numerical evaluation was very
quick (0.235 seconds), we gave the statistical meth-
ods more time (60 seconds). After all, the purpose
of Table VII is only to show that our results
are consistent with the literature even when the
repair transitions are disabled. Again, no run time
was given for Arcade in [4]. Note that standard
Monte Carlo and BFB give the best results in
this setting because their simplicity allows them
to sample many more runs within the (real) time
constraint. When we allow repairs to occur the
pˆi # runs
MC 0.5981± 0.0003 8 304 940
BFB 0.5976± 0.0003 5 116 887
Path-IS 0.5977± 0.0019 93 526
pi # states
PRISM 0.5980 421 875
Arcade 0.5980 2 100
Table VII
Unreliability (pˆi) results without repair when µ = 0; n = 2,
λ = 1/6000.
unreliability drops to approximately 0.0029. It takes
PRISM little more than 30 seconds to compute this
probability. This computation time does not depend
on λ, as it took a comparable amount of time to
generate the results of Table VIII, where we lowered
λ to 16 · 10−6.
However, when we increase µ, the time that
PRISM needs to produce a solution increases along
with it. The applied numerical methods require that
the transition rate matrix be uniformised, and the
uniformisation rate increases linearly in µ. PRISM’s
computation time in turn increases linearly in the
product of the uniformisation rate and the mission
time (see [12], chapter 15). Because the uniformi-
sation rate is so much higher than the original exit
rate of the empty state, many unnecessary self-loops
are taken into account. This can heavily slow down
the computation. On the other hand, the accuracy of
pˆi (10−9) # runs
MC 0± 0 18 438 588
BFB 2.936± 0.024 1 042 866
Path-IS 2.937± 0.001 992 231
pi (10−9) # states
PRISM 2.936 421 875
Table VIII
Unreliability (pˆi) results when µ = 1; n = 2, λ = 1
6
· 10−6.
the Path-IS estimate remains constant as µ increases
since the jumps out of the empty state still occur
with the same low rate. A few estimates together
with PRISM computation times are given in Fig-
ure 4. Notice that when µ = 100, PRISM takes
over half an hour to produce an approximation,
while our simulation method can produce a decent
estimate in 10 seconds.
Figure 4. Estimates for the probability pi (the unreliability) from
PRISM (dashed, crosses) and Path-IS (dashed, circles) on left
vertical axis; PRISM run time (solid, crosses) on right vertical
axis. The Path-IS run time was only 10 seconds, but the bounds
of the 95%-confidence interval were still not distinguishable
from the estimate at this scale.
For high µ (and high τ ), the confidence intervals
of BFB are also noticeably wider than those of
Path-IS. For µ = 1000 (10 second run time), they
were 2.943±0.013 and 2.920±0.358 (times 10−6)
respectively. Again, discussing why goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
For higher n PRISM again starts to suffer from
the state-space explosion problem. We omit results
for this scenario as they are comparable to the
results for the unavailability when n is high.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
A. General Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced an efficient sim-
ulation technique that is able to estimate depend-
ability measures in situations were system failure
is a rare event due to high repair rates or low
component failure rates. The approach that we used,
based on (1) the zero-variance measure for transient
failure probabilities in CTMCs, and (2) likely paths
to failure, is something that we hope to generalise
to other situations in the future.
We have demonstrated that our technique per-
forms well even for large models as long as the
component failure rates are much lower than the
repair rates. Also, we have shown that our method
performs well in comparison to other methods.
Numerical techniques, as, e.g., implemented in
PRISM, suffer from large state spaces and high
uniformisation rates.
B. State Space Explosion vs. Extra Computations
The beauty of discrete-event simulation is that the
state space does not need to be generated a priori.
However, if no information about the states is stored
then the values wˆ∗(~x) need to be computed again
every time we encounter the same ~x throughout the
simulation process. For the simulations, we used
a caching approach in order to balance between
these two extremes: we did not generate the state
space beforehand, but each time a value wˆ∗(~x) was
computed for a new ~x we stored it in a dynamic
array in order to keep record only of the most
interesting part of the state space.
However, when the list grows larger throughout
the simulation process each step takes more time. A
different approach could be to only store the values
wˆ∗ for the states that are on or next to the straight
paths, and recalculate all the other values at each
step. An interesting topic of further research would
be to investigate how these approaches influence the
time needed to run simulations.
C. General System Failure Conditions
In this paper, we have only considered system
failures caused by the number of failures of one
component type i reaching a critical level ni. More
general failure conditions, e.g., system failure oc-
curring when at some time point t < τ certain
numbers nk1 , . . . , nkc have failed for c component
types k1 . . . , kc, should not form a major obstacle.
More paths to failure may need to be considered
for a good approximation wˆ — perhaps even a
number of paths that increases exponentially in c —
but many of them typically have equal probability
which makes accounting for them easier.
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